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Albanians and "Mountain Bandits" 
FREDERICK F. ANSCOMBE 
'le numerous historians have recognized the problems which VV" Mountain Bandits"' (Dag'li Eskiyalari) and other outlaw groups ca- 
used in the Balkans before and during the reign of Selim I11 (r. 1789-1807), 
few have given much attention to the brigands themselves, their origins, 
and their reasons for taking up banditry. Ottomanists have tended to focus 
on Istanbul's efforts to control the problem and on the role of provincial 
notables in the  trouble^.^ The national tradition in Balkan historiography, 
on the other hand, has often tended to lump Muslims together as "Turks," 
incomprehensible, incorrigible, intolerable. It also has been prone to consi- 
der banditry as a self-contained, "national" problem (i.e., Bulgaria suffered 
from the rampages of k&rdzhalis/kircali S, Serbia endured Janissary and dahi 
oppression, Wallachia and Romania faced rapacious Janissaries), rather than 
recognizing it as a problem unconfined by then-unknown national borders. 
Yet banditry was a problem which affected most of the Ottoman Balkans, 
and those choosing a life outside the law did so for a wide range of reasons 
and came from a variety of backgrounds. A great many bandits were not 
ethnic "Turks" but rather were Albanian~.~ 
This article will offer a preliminary assessment of the Albanian elements 
in the Mountain Bandit and parallel outlaw phenomena, the reasons leading 
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so many Albanians to brigandage, and the steps taken by the government to 
control the problem. Ottoman records from other periods regularly reveal 
Albanian engagement in "banditry" (an elastic term in Ottoman usage, inc- 
luding everything from highway robbery to local feuds to struggles betwe- 
en regional political factions),' with variations in locale and intensity, but 
generally at a tolerable level. Such extralegal violence could be expected, 
given a generally well-armed population governed by a limited, pre-modern 
state, especially in a case where the population inhabited rough terrain. This 
Albanian participation in brigandage is easier to track than for many other 
social groups in Ottoman lands, because Albanian (Arnavud) was one of the 
relatively few ethnic markers regularly added to the usual religious (Mus- 
lim-Zimmi) tags used to identify people in state  record^.^ These records 
show that the magnitude of banditry involving Albanians grew through the 
1770s and 1780s to reach crisis proportions in the 1790s and 1800s. 
The reasons for this extended rise in brigandage are rather less elegant 
or heroic than some theorists of Ottoman banditry would suggest. Karen 
Barkey, discussing the Anatolian celalis of the seventeenth century, made a 
provocative claim for seeing this banditry as a tool of negotiation between 
the government and provincial groups feeling pressure from a centralizing 
state.6 While some bidders for provincial office did hire mercenary bands 
to try to seize power (as in the case of Matli Osman cited below), in the 
1790s the general lack of bandit interest in bargaining for state favors is stri- 
king: most brigands showed a clear understanding that the real, immediate 
rewards were to be won by taking advantage of the state's weakness. Those 
who did try to seize provincial offices seem to have been motivated more by 
the obvious opportunities for immediate enrichment through abuse of office 
in a time of weak oversight, rather than by a desire to gain rewards from the 
state for service. 
Still less did these brigands demonstrate the slightest affinity to the 
"hajduk" - "social bandit" ideal hypothesized by Eric Hobsbawm (and in 
more extreme form by some Balkan historians), featuring Christian hajduks 
(Tr. haydud) or klephts as "national" (Howbsbawm's italics) proto-revolu- 
tionaries fighting against an oppressive, alien, "Turkish" ~ys tem.~  As far as 
can be determined, the great majority of the Albanian brigands (and all of 
their leaders) were Muslim and certainly plundered whoever was vulne- 
rable, both Muslims and non-Muslims. Rather than motivated by ideology, 
most simply sought even marginal profit. Small though the rewards often 
were, they nevertheless offered an escape from the often dreadful poverty 
and living conditions found in the brigands' homelands. This was true also 
for those subgroups usually identified in recent histories of this period as 
the bandits, namely soldiers discharged after the end of the war with Aus- 
tria and Russia in 1792, or mercenary troops who had deserted from the 
private retinues of local notables in the eastern balk an^.^ To live securely 
and comfortably was rarely an easily achieved goal in Albania, but the pres- 
sures created by repeated wars made it much tougher in this period. One 
of the most damaging war-induced problems was Istanbul's loss of control 
over provincial authorities, who quickly discovered that the government 
would turn a blind eye to almost any unjust act, as long as these notables 
continued to send men to serve in the army. Like the bandits themselves, 
the notables took advantage of the state's distractions to seize land, wealth, 
and power. The Ottoman government proved unable to reestablish effective 
control over these notables, let alone to improve conditions in the Albanian 
provinces, and thus poor, armed Albanians continued to emigrate to seek a 
living in any way possible throughout the reign of Selim 111. 
Bandits! Bandits! Bandits! 
Istanbul received a seemingly unending stream of reports in the 1780s, 
1790s, and 1800s which detailed the depredations of marauders in all cor- 
ners of Ottoman Europe. Taken to suggest the scale of the problems faced 
by both the government and the inhabitants of the Balkans, the following 
examples describe the activities of Albanian bands and bandits in different 
places, years, and situations. 
In June 1792 the Sublime Porte learned from several sources that a 
number of Albanian bandit groups were roaming western and central Mace- 
donia, creating havoc.9 A certain Matli Osman (from today's Mat, in central 
Albanial0) marched to Pirlepe (Prilep, western Republic of Macedonia) with 
a band of three hundred Albanians to claim the position of local military 
commander. The residents of Pirlepe refused them entry, and the leading ad- 
ministrator of the town sent a request for help to a notable of Dibre (Debar, 
western Macedonia). One Mulla Yunus, a resident of Peskipa (Peshkopi, 
central Albania) and an ally of this notable, duly arrived outside Pirlepe, ac- 
companied by eight hundred Albanians, only to discover that Matli Osman's 
men had departed. They had vanquished the defenders of Pirlepe and, after 
being paid 25 kese akge (12,500 silver coins, worth roughly f 10) to leave, 
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had gone on to find employment with a claimant to the position of ayan 
(chief local notable) of iStip (hip, eastern Macedonia). Under his direction 
they were to harry this and surrounding districts." The luckless leader of 
Pirlepe tried to send away Mulla Yunus and his men, since they were no 
longer needed, but they demanded their wages. As all these groups did, they 
lived off the land until they were paid, in this case another twelve kese akce, 
as the people of Pirlepe were by now too poor to pay more. Mulla Yunus and 
his men subsequently headed toward Dibre. Other bands of Albanians from 
Klrsova (KiEevo, western Macedonia) and Dibre now entered the free-for- 
all, some joining Matli Osman outside 1~tip, while others swarmed around 
Kopriilu (Veles, central Macedonia). In all, some 1,500-2,000 Albanians 
from central Albania and western Macedonia were ranging across much 
of the rest of the present-day Republic of Macedonia, as far as Kostendil 
(Kyustendil, western Bulgaria), stripping the land of both money and food 
and causing much of the population to flee their homes. 
The violent struggle over the ayanllk of &tip had drawn Matli Osman 
and others to eastern Macedonia, and disputes over provincial offices or 
provincial officeholders there and elsewhere offered opportunities to many 
other hired guns in this period. In July 1795 two administrators of 1stefe 
(district of Thebes, southern Greece), themselves Albanian, were called to 
court in Athens to settle a conflict involving theft of property and murder. 
One of them showed up, as did a representative of the other party. His part- 
ner, however, gathered a band of Albanians under his command and refused 
to submit. He then joined forces with the local ayan and kocabaps (local 
notables, Muslim and Christian, respectively), who themselves faced char- 
ges of levying an illegal "second tithe" on crops. Albanians seem to have 
provided the backbone of something akin to a local legal defiance bloc.12 
As the legal system in the provinces became less effective in this period 
of turmoil, those who lost positions and possessions to powerful local no- 
tables also recruited Albanians to strike back at those above the law. Late 
in 1788 the powerful ayan of Siroz (Serres, northern Greece), 1smail Bey, 
returned home after the first campaign season of the 1787-92 war against 
Austria and Russia, only to find that a number of his properties had been 
sacked by bandits. The destruction affected not just the district of Siroz but 
that of Demir Hisar (Siderokastro, Greece) as well. The main force of the 
bandits consisted of two thousand Albanian followers of a certain Orhan 
Bey of Bera~tan, near Permed (Permet, southern Albania). One of the lea- 
ding disturbers of the peace, who had recruited Orhan and his men, howe- 
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ver, also sent a complaint to Istanbul, charging that 1smail Bey had illegally 
seized his estates (p!j?1iks).l3 That 1smail confronted a similar outburst of 
violence ten years later suggests that his noteworthy personal authority did 
not rest easily on the region. In 1799 the brother of the nazrr (supervisor of 
revenues) of Drama (Greece) joined forces with one of the most notorious 
leaders of Albanian Mountain Bandits, Manav ibrahim, to pillage the distri- 
ct of Nevrekop (Gotse Delchev, Bulgaria) as part of a long struggle against 
ismail's domination. 1smail naturally "managed the problem by recruiting 
his own gang from Albania.14 
Large, independent, roving gangs such as those of Manav ibrahim, Ali 
Zot,15 and the other leading figures of the Mountain Bandit phenomenon 
were an even greater concern for Istanbul than were such localized, recrui- 
ted bands as those of Orhan Bey or Mulla Yunus. A great many of the rank- 
and-file bandits were Albanian,16 which presented the government's officers 
an additional potential problem, because so many of their own soldiers were 
also Albanian. Sometimes these government irregular troops (levends or sek- 
bans) fought determinedly against the bandits, but on other occasions they 
cooperated with, or even deserted to, the outlaws.17 This can be illustrated 
by the experiences of but one provincial notable who held a successibn of 
important posts, Hasan Pasha of Zihne (Zihna, northern Greece). In the early 
1790s he served as governor of Silistre (Silistra, northeastern Bulgaria), an 
important post for the defense of the Danube and for the struggle against the 
Mountain Bandits. His position caused him to be given the primary respon- 
sibility for battling the bandits in 1792-93, a task in which he was ultima- 
tely unsuccessful, at least in part because many of his own men, Albanians, 
joined the brigands. As was often the case, arrears of pay due for service 
probably boosted such desertions. Hasan Pasha nevertheless continued to 
rely heavily upon Albanians thereafter. When he was dismissed from a later 
office in 1794, he was ordered to make sure that the one thousand Albanians 
in his retinue received all of the pay due them and were sent directly home, 
lest they, too, were to seek to recover back wages by joining the Mountain 
Bandits. lg 
Although ethnic, or more likely clan, ties may have played a role in 
some Albanians' changing sides in the struggle, it was this desire to be paid 
that appears to have driven the actions of so many of them on both sides of 
the government-bandit divide. In June 1800 the brigand Bayraktar Arnavud 
Hiiseyn, besieged with his men in Bana (Soko Banja, north of NiS, Serbia), 
persuaded a number of the besiegers to join his group in the town. It was no 
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doubt meaningful that both bandits and turncoats were Tosks19 from southern 
Albania- but Hiiseyn's distribution of money may well have been as impor- 
tant as the commonality of backgr~und.~ Under such conditions, switching 
masters thus did not always have to go against the state. This could be seen 
in Vidin (Bulgaria), the base of the rebellious pasha Osman Pasvanoglu [var. 
Pasvano~lu/Pasvantoglu/ Pasbanoglu] and one of the great centers of unrest 
in the Ottoman Balkans at the turn of the century. When Osman did not pay 
his own Albanian troops, some offered to come over to the government's 
side, provided that the state could demonstrate its ability to pay wages." The 
state treasury being perennially empty, gaining the loyalty of its employees 
through prompt payment of wages was a tremendous challenge, however." 
As this limited selection of examples indicates, practically no region of 
the Balkans escaped problems involving Albanians operating outside of the 
law. Some particularly severely affected areas, such as geographic Macedo- 
nia, faced depopulation, while others, such as the Morea, southern Greece, 
and Serbia, would later be centers of ins~rrection.~~ Yet it is also true that 
much of the government's remaining ability to control the Balkan provinces 
rested in the hands of Albanian officers and troops. Albanians were certainly 
not irrevocably doomed to a life of banditry, with all legal options unthin- 
kable. What, then, were the causes for the unusually severe outbreak of 
violence during this period? 
Underlying Problems 
Conditions throughout the Balkans in this era encouraged or forced many 
men to take up arms, either as brigands or as irregular soldiers who might 
not be much better than bandits. Bosnians and other Muslims of the region 
took part in the chaos, yet Albanians played an especially prominent role." 
This suggests that it was not only the conditions felt throughout the peninsula 
during and after the 1787-92 war that drew in Albanians, but also circums- 
tances peculiar to those districts in the western Balkans which had signifi- 
cant Albanian populations. It appears that those conditions were particularly 
severe. 
A) Environment and Agriculture 
Even in the best of times, the conditions of life found in regions inhabited 
primarily by Albanians were tough. The population density in these areas 
was relatively high-strikingly so, when the nature of the land is taken into 
consideration. Remarkably little of the land now within the borders of the 
Republic of Albania was ideally suited to agriculture in the Ottoman peri- 
od. Almost three-quarters of the area was forested mountain and, until the 
advent of modern drainage techniques, much of the remainder was wet- 
land.25 While some Albanian-inhabited lands in present-day northern Gree- 
ce, western Macedonia, and Kosovo were slightly less forbidding, they, too, 
fit the general description of a region ill-suited to intensive and extensive 
agriculture. Throughout the Ottoman period, Albanians had to migrate to 
find farmland or other means of making a living, because the population so 
frequently tested the limits of what their rural homelands could support. 
Endemic infectious diseases added to the precariousness of life and thus 
doubtless also helped to push many to migrate. Albania and Epirus were 
known centers of infectious diseases, especially in the eighteenth ~entury.'~ 
The marshy flatlands surrounding such important settlements as Avlonya 
(Vlore, southern Albania) and Dl ra~  (Durres, central Albania) were bree- 
ding-grounds for mosquitoes carrying malaria. The highlands of Albania, 
whose population depended heavily upon pastoralism, suffered from other 
threats associated more clearly with animals. Plague was a particularly dan- 
gerous recurring problem, reported regularly in an arc from Yanya (Ioanni- 
na, Greece) in the south to l~kodra (Shkoder, Albania) and Prizren (Koso- 
vo) in the north. Foreign consular reports noted the presence of plague in 
Albania-Epirus in 42 years of the eighteenth century -almost certainly an 
undercount, given limited consular access to the rugged interior." 
During the period of rising banditry, disease was but one of the ha- 
zards that became critical in the western Balkans. In Yanya, for example, the 
French consul reported a plague epidemic lasting from 1784 to 1787. Vene- 
tian records note plague in 19kodra in 1798-99 and 1803-4." The disease 
indeed appears to have become a severe problem throughout the peninsula, 
spread no doubt by Albanian brigands and soldiers, as well as soldiers re- 
turning from the Danubian principalities. In 1795, for example, Orthodox 
residents of Zagra (Stara Zagora, Bulgaria) were accused of trying to take 
advantage of the government's preoccupation with controlling both plague 
and bandits to build an unsanctioned new church." Shortages of food also 
appear to have been a severe problem at times, particularly in the first half of 
the 1790~.~O In the case of Matli Osman and the various brigands encamped 
around Pirlepe, described above, it was by no means incidental that food 
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was one of their primary demands, and that the local population quickly 
faced the specter of starvation themselves. A decade later, the vali (gover- 
nor) of Rumeli, who enlisted Albanian highlanders to track down mountain 
bandit groups, was shocked by his recruits' abject poverty, describing them 
as little better than naked.31 
The difficulties encountered in ensuring a sufficient food supply for the 
Albanian population were probably aggravated by the continuing spread of 
gifiliks throughout the region. Ciftliks were estates considered and treated 
as essentially private property, rather than as lands at the free disposition 
of the sultan, as was the case with land assigned as dirlik (prebend, such 
as the timars designed to support cavalrymen) to members of the military 
class, who were to use the revenue to equip themselves for campaign. In 
and of itself, estate formation was not necessarily a bad thing. Previously 
unproductive land could become the gij?lik of the person who brought it 
under cultivation, for example. Even the transformation of state dirlik into 
private giftlik might be beneficial to the military, as long as the estate-holder 
made sure that the army gained a dependable source of the ever-more-cri- 
tical irregular sekban infantry instead of the cavalry previously supported 
by the timar-dirlik.32 This was especially true in the western Balkans, given 
the exemplary reputation of Albanian sekbans, and indeed it had long been 
understood that notables appointed to office in Albanian provinces would 
use revenue from lands under their control to outfit sekbans for Ottoman 
service. While some land in the region remained in the dirlik category even 
after the end of the timar system in the 1830s, much more became ciftlik 
through this conversion process in the eighteenth century, as well as through 
that of land re~lamation.~~ 
More damaging and more common than these, however, were the other 
means of creating private estates on already-worked land during this ex- 
tended time of chaos. These generally involved the use of force to acquire 
rights over privileged lands and peasants. A number of areas in the region 
had never been fully incorporated into the dirlik system, which meant that 
many villages, farms and pastures enjoyed freedom from close oversight 
and from some of the usual tax burden borne by peasants on a timar. The 
sultan and his family, for example, retained control over broad swathes of 
land, appointing their own agents to collect the revenue. Other lands were 
set aside as vaklf (pious endowment), with revenue again collected by the 
administrator of each endowment or his agent. Derbend (highland pass) 
villages also were a quite common feature in a region as mountainous as 
the western Balkans. The derbend villagers enjoyed significant relief from 
taxes in return for their service policing the roads and passes near their sett- 
lements. Other villages had similar rights in return for guarding the coast. 
Throughout this period of wars and turmoil, a growing number of such pri- 
vileged villages and farms (in addition to nominally dirlik lands) fell under 
the control of powerful local notables. 
The procedure adopted was frequently some variation of the following.34 
Given the lack of close oversight of a privileged village by any influential 
protector, a locally powerful man-military officer, ayan, tax farmer, self- 
appointed police chief-would demand the payment of taxes from which 
the villagers were excused, or which they had already paid to the properly- 
appointed agent. The villagers could not easily refuse. Given the generally 
low level of wealth possible for peasants on often marginal land, soon they 
fell deeply into debt. Unable to meet the rising demands for money, they 
eventually would offer to place themselves under the control of someone 
who could pay the debts and protect them from such arbitrary, illegal taxa- 
tion. Whether or not the legal status of the land changed to giftlik or remai- 
ned as before (as would be the case with vaklf, for example), however, the 
peasants thereafter often continued to have to pay higher taxes than the laws 
prescribed. 
The state often could offer little help to those who appealed for assistan- 
ce beyond refusing to grant post facto legality to land grabs. In a village in 
Yanya district, for example, pasturelands were taken illegally as giftlik by a 
local notable, but the state's officers could not reverse the seizure. The best 
that could be done for the dispossessed villagers was to refuse to sanction the 
transfer of the new giftlik to the notable's heirs after his death.35 In this ex- 
tended era of state weakness, the fact that one powerful notable, Tepedelenli 
Ali Pasha of Yanya, was able to accumulate up to one thousand giftliks by the 
end of his career in 1822 gives an idea of the spread of estates, although it is 
impossible to determine the number of these that were new or Yet it 
is clear that the spread of giftliks, with the often accompanying heavier taxa- 
tion, helped to impoverish many who worked the land, pushed others off it, 
and contributed to the problems of feeding the population in troubled times. 
B) Provincial Authorities 
Integral to the widespread, recurring destitution seen in the Balkan provinces 
were the stresses produced by war from 1787 to 1792, in addition to those 
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caused by the mountain bandits themselves thereafter. While banditry was 
always to some degree a problem in the Albanian-inhabited lands, much of 
the region escaped the most obvious effects of military campaigning against 
either Habsburgs or Russians, since no armies passed through on the way 
to the front lines. This had also been the case during the disastrous 1768-74 
war with Russia. Yet both of these wars and the ensuing internal distur- 
bances did affect the region, helping to push many Albanians into joining 
brigand bands. The link between distant war fronts and local turbulence lay 
in provincial leadership. 
One of the most significant ways in which even distant campaigning 
promoted penury and chaos, and then brigandage, among Albanian groups 
was that it gave ayan effective carte blanche to break the law. Along with 
Osman Pasvanoglu of Vidin, the most commonly cited examples of ayan 
who crippled Istanbul's authority by acting violently and disobeying orders 
are Bu~atli Kara Mahmud Pasha of 1Skodra and Tepedelenli Ali Pasha of 
Yanya. What is much less commonly recognized is that the two Albanian 
pashas initially established their local autonomy by serving Istanbul's war- 
induced, temporary critical interests, especially in providing invaluable men 
to fight the Austrians and Russians. In serving the state in this limited sense, 
in effect they earned the privilege to demand that Istanbul turn a blind eye 
to their own plans for self-aggrandizement. 
During much of the period between 1699 and 1768, Istanbul had been 
able to keep the violence-prone rivalries that commonly feature in a kins- 
hip-based society such as Albania's under some degree of control. From 
the early days of Ottoman rule, the empire had tried to manage the region 
by tying the interests of its leading families to the well-being of the state, 
incorporating many of them into the ruling askeri class.'? In return for titles, 
offices, and control of some land, a number of these families became effec- 
tive servants of the sultan, guarding the region against Venice and sending 
soldiers when needed elsewhere. Should these ayan and other office-holders 
abuse their positions of influence, however, or fail to deliver tax revenues 
and soldiers to Istanbul, they were dismissed. This system was not unlike 
that found in provinces elsewhere in the eighteenth century, the "Age of 
Ay~ns."'~ It usually worked reasonably well. Ali Pasha himself, born of a 
notable Tosk family, lost his first important office after five months of ruth- 
less "service"-and he was not the first member of his family to suffer such 
quick dismissal for misc~nduct .~~ 
Istanbul's interest in, and therefore capacity for, keeping aggressive no- 
tables in check slipped in the era of repeated wars after 1768. The state's 
reaction to reports of one ayan's misdeeds in 1772 offers an illuminating 
example of the change of priorities. The activities of a notable of Filorina 
(Florina, Greece) aroused complaints, but Istanbul chose to ignore them. 
The ayan was expected to equip and lead five hundred soldiers on the upco- 
ming campaign against Russia; if he were made to answer the complaints, 
he would naturally be unable to show up with those valuable troops. It was 
decided, therefore, to delay justice until the campaign finished? "Justice 
delayed" might not unreasonably be considered "justice denied," however, 
especially when the state, defeated, emerged from the war in such a wea- 
kened condition. The lesson would be hard to miss. Indeed, the 1770s saw 
very energetic struggles between ambitious Albanian notables? 
These struggles did not die away before 1787, and the renewal of war 
in that year only encouraged the competing ayan to new efforts. True to its 
form in earlier times of crisis, the state did not show its usual interest in 
investigating matters of justice, preferring to opt for the immediately rewar- 
ding expedient in the interests of finding soldiers. After Austria showed its 
readiness to withdraw from the war in 1790, for example, the vali of Rumeli 
began preparations for raising an army against Russia in the next campaign 
season. When he looked at Albania, the view frustrated him: a great pool of 
potential soldiers, but most of them (and most of the provincial revenues) 
were tied up in ayan squabbles. Each district (sancak) governor felt thre- 
atened by his neighbor, poured money into strengthening his own defen- 
ses-and then wanted to annex another sancak in order to be able to afford 
the arms race. The result was that, if the governor of a district were ordered 
to join the army with one thousand men, plus his household troops, he eit- 
her would ignore the directive completely or, his attention and resources 
engaged elsewhere, would show up briefly with one or two hundred men, 
proving to be of no help to anyone. The vali's solution was to have the state 
make clear to each recalcitrant notable that it wanted the levy of soldiers 
which his sancak was assigned to raise, preferably with the help of the no- 
table, but, if a neighboring rival showed greater willingness, then Istanbul 
would be happy to give the rival control over the s ~ n c a k . ~ ~  
As before, this policy of expediency had shortcomings, and now there 
were particularly aggressive men, such as Tepedelenli Ali Pasha, to exploit 
them. The vali thought it particularly important to bring about a reconcili- 
ation between Ali and his bitterest rival, hrahim Pasha of Avlonya. Their 
rivalry was to continue for many years, but already it was widely known for 
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its intensity. Peace between the two men thus could not fail but to have a 
good effect on other ayan rivalries. The problem with Ali Pasha, however, 
was that he adhered to peace agreements only until he saw a good opportu- 
nity to strike again at his original target.43 And whenever he struck, he did 
so with devastating consequences to both rivals and general population." 
He also was ready to back other ayan who might be useful to him, working 
more indirectly to increase his own wealth and inf luen~e .~~ Whatever the 
means chosen to enlarge his own power, the net result was to threaten the li- 
ves and livelihood of others, driving both peasants and notables to seek their 
living out of his reach. Ali managed to get away with this kind of behavior 
for thirty years, however, because he also usually did take care to answer the 
state's demands for fighting men. Indeed, that is how he won his position in 
Yanya in 1787. He was appointed governor there in order to raise and lead 
an army against Kara Mahmud Pasha of ~~kodra ,  who had himself caused 
so many problems for his neighbors that Istanbul felt obliged to remove him 
by military means.46 
Kara Mahmud was such a disruptive force in these years that it really 
should be no surprise that the western Balkans fell into lasting turmoil." In 
listing the sancaks included in Ottoman Albania in 1790, the vali did not 
even bother to include i~kodra, perhaps because it was a district so comp- 
letely dominated by its difficult governor that its resources could be tapped 
only by separate agreement with him. By that time Kara Mahmud had al- 
ready faced more than one military expedition sent to punish him for his 
forays into adjacent territories; the threat of Istanbul throwing its support to 
one of his rivals would not impress him overmuch. He did have many men 
at his disposal, however, and when Istanbul desperately needed soldiers, it 
did try to persuade him to deliver them. On more than one occasion, he did 
so. Following the Austrian advance into the province of Bosnia in 1788, for 
example, Kara Mahmud was promoted to the rank of vezir, given the eyalet 
of Anadolu (Anatolia, essentially a lucrative financial reward), and assigned 
the responsiblity of defending Yeni Pazar (Novi Pazar, Serbia).48 Kara Mah- 
mud fulfilled his new duties for a time but, like Ali Pasha, proved unable to 
give up for long his designs on neighboring territories, resuming his raids 
by the end of the war.49 
One of the primary objects of desire for Kara Mahmud, as for other 
notables, was the port of Dira~,  whose customs duties were a valuable sour- 
ce of revenue normally worked by a tax farmer. It was one of a number 
of properties in the vicinity of the sancak of 19kodra controlled by Asma 
Sultan, the sister of Sultan Abdiilhamid I. Asma Sultan became one of Kara 
Mahmud's determined enemies in Istanbul because of the threat he posed 
to her holdings.50 Di ra~  was particularly important for consideration of the 
reasons behind emigration from Albania, however, not only because of the 
general turmoil engendered by the struggles for control over it, but more 
specifically because its insecure, embattled position represents the difficul- 
ties which faced anyone wishing to make a living from commerce. 
C) Commerce 
Trade, both internal and external, had grown in importance in the western 
Balkans during much of the eighteenth century. This growth was simply part 
of the expansion of commerce seen through much of the empire? The rise 
in external trade, at least, must have been aided by the opening of ports such 
as Dlra~  and Avlonya to European consuls after 1699. Within the peninsula, 
the development of a network of local and regional trade fairs (panayzr) 
helped the growth of commerce, as did the increase in use of financial tools 
such as bills of exchange.52 Given the relative poverty and limited oppor- 
tunities for agriculture in their provinces, it is not surprising that many Al- 
banians turned to trading both local goods and the produce of distant lands. 
Among the most important exports were wool, hides, livestock, tobacco, 
rice, olive oil, salt, cotton, and silk. Artisan guilds also produced manufa- 
ctures, including weapons, which were traded elsewhere in the Balkans. 
While maritime trade with Europe passed through ports such as Avlonya, 
Dlra~,  iflgiin (Ulcinj, Montenegro), and Arta (Greece), the overland tra- 
de centers were spread throughout the interior, including important ones at 
Yanya, Elbasan (central Albania), Arnavud Belgrad (Berat, central Albania), 
Kavaya (Kavaje, central Albania), and Prizren and Prigtina (Kosovo). The 
two with perhaps the strongest claims to importance, however, were 1~kodra 
and lskopol/Oskopol (Voskopoje, southeast Albania, commonly known as 
Mosch~polis).~~ 
Both of these leading inland centers of commerce suffered badly from 
the unsettled conditions of this time. The thriving commercial and cultural 
center of lskopol offered a tempting target to nearby notables who needed 
money quickly, since it had little protection or oversight by any powerful 
governor or ~ y a n . ~ ~  Late in the seventeenth century it had been a village 
included in a zeamet held by a secretary in the imperial land registry in 
I s t a n b ~ l . ~ ~  By the 1780s it had become part of the imperial properties (em- 
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lak-i hiimayun), still dependent upon Istanbul, and vulnerable to repeated 
harassment from neighboring villages and more distant powers? The town 
was sacked three times during the Ottoman wars with Russia and Austria, 
in 1769, 1772, and 1789, but not by foreign raiders. The last attack, by Ali 
Pasha's men, practically destroyed the town. Some of its commerce shifted 
to Gorice (Korse, Albania) and Arnavud Belgrad, but those towns could not 
make good the losses suffered by 1skopol." 
The fate of 1~kodra was rather different, although it, too, suffered from 
some of the same factors to be seen in Ali's lands to the south. Once Ali se- 
cured his control over tax farms, towns, and large swathes of land in Yanya 
and neighboring districts, he encouraged commerce. Charging high prices 
for goods and levying high taxes, he could command great profits from pra- 
ctically every transaction. Merchants accepted this in part because they had 
little choice, in part because Ali tried seriously to maintain public secu- 
rity, and in part because it was becoming ever clearer that fortunes might 
be made by all in neutral-flag trade during the Napoleonic period. Kara 
Mahmud also established his pervasive influence on commerce in the north, 
given his own notable collection of gzftliks and tax farms. He gained a domi- 
nant voice in the grain and pitch trades, for example, and in shipping out of 
~ lg i in .  With his accumulated power and wealth, he, too, could charge high 
prices and fees, although he seemed to take greater care to foster good re- 
lations with merchants than did Ali Pasha in the south and almost certainly 
enjoyed much stronger popular backing in his domains than did the pasha of 
Yanya. One reason for Kara Mahmud's support among the important mer- 
chant community of ~~kodra ,  as well as among the city's artisans, was his 
willingness to provide "services" in return. Like Ali Pasha, he tried to keep 
the various unruly groups within his domains in check. Since the degree of 
Istanbul's direct writ of authority within the province was limited by distra- 
ctions elsewhere and by the strength of a governor as entrenched as Kara 
Mahmud, moreover, 19kodra's merchants could more safely ignore imperial 
restrictions on trade, including the standing orders against the export of cri- 
tical commodities to Christian countries or restrictions on the use of foreign 
curren~y.'~ In short, Kara Mahmud was a defender against both disorder at 
home and predatory authorities outside of the san~ak. '~  
Some, at least, of the problems with external authorities thrown in the 
way of 12kodra's traders could accurately be blamed upon Kara Mahmud 
himself, however. The menace he posed to neighboring notables and to the 
state's authority prompted them to try to apply pressure on him by squee- 
zing his merchants. His apparently tireless (and sometimes violent) efforts 
to acquire land and tax farms left those threatened feeling that 19kodra owed 
them a debt, which they duly tried to collect by seizing its merchants' goods 
and money whenever they came within reach. For example, the losses to 
igkodran traders in Dlras were one factor explaining why Kara Mahmud 
could not give up his hopes of acquiring control over it." The threat of in- 
terference in the grain and pitch trades, based around Elbasan and Arnavud 
Belgrad, also helped to push him to attack mid-Albania's leading notable of 
the 1770s and 1780s' Kurd Ahmed Pasha, then the governor of Avlonya and 
one of his leading rivals. This campaign in 1785 eventually brought him yet 
another Ottoman army, sent to strip him of office, title, and property. When 
Kara Mahrnud fell afoul of Istanbul, as in his conflicts with neighboring 
ayan, it was 19kodra's merchants who paid the stiffest penalty. In 1793-94, 
when its governor was declared yet again in rebellion against the sultan fol- 
lowing renewed incursions into Elbasan, Istanbul ordered that 19kodra was 
to be completely blockaded, and any of its natives found trading elsewhere 
were to be imprisoned, as were those with whom they traded? And even if 
the traders managed to avoid arrest, they too had to be on guard against ban- 
dits, who regularly robbed merchants and attacked panayzrs in the western 
as in the eastern Balkans. While the changes in value and volume of trade 
throughout the Albanian provinces in the 1790s and 1800s are impossible to 
measure, the overall trend cannot have been ever-upward under conditions 
such as these. 
D) Emigration 
If both commerce and farming were particularly hazardous or onerous in 
this period, then what other alternative means of earning a livelihood still 
existed? Albanians throughout the eighteenth century, and earlier, had mig- 
rated in search of work." Except for those engaged in trade or war, many 
(but by no means all) of the jobs they found were semi- or unskilled. Patrona 
Halil, a seller of used clothing in Istanbul and the leader of the revolt which 
overthrew Sultan Ahmed I11 in 1730, is particularly well known but otherwi- 
se not atypical. Sultans periodically issued decrees barring such unskilled 
job-seekers from migrating to I~ t anbu l .~~  The bans were never completely 
effective, however, and there always was a large Albanian community in 
the imperial capital, and indeed in the sultan's palace. When war broke out 
in 1787, all non-Muslims in the Balkans were to turn in any weapons they 
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might have, in return for fair compensation; any non-Muslim found armed 
thereafter was to lose his weapons without compen~ation.~ The sultan issu- 
ed an exemption from this restriction to merchants and others who needed 
to protect themselves against bandits while traveling-including thirty ca- 
retakers of the palace water pipes and drains, who were going to visit their 
families in the district of Ergiri Kasn (Gjirokaster, southern Albania).65 
Other groups of Albanian emigres, however, saw their employment 
opportunities in the capital and other areas limited sharply. Albanians had 
come to monopolize the lime-burning trade around Istanbul, for example, 
but the government ordered them sent home and for lime to be brought from 
Selanik (Salonica, Greece), an old source of supply.66 Albanians were hardly 
more welcome in provinces such as Selanik or Yeni~ehir (Larissa, Greece), 
since they had come to be associated with troubles, and not only with ban- 
ditry. Standing orders had been issued in the 1770s against Albanians taking 
up tax farms outside of their native provinces, for example.67 The orders had 
little lasting effect, of course; the enduring banditry problems of the 1790s 
led to the renewal of wishful calls for barring Albanians from holding sensi- 
tive tax farms? Whether tax farmers or not, almost all Albanians came to be 
viewed with suspicion and resentment. An incident from Yenigehir may ser- 
ve as an example of what might result. A large group of local people, both 
Muslim and Christian, took the orders against the tax farmers as a license to 
attack other Albanians and thus assaulted those guarding a nearby derbend, 
killing six. Such an act shocked the government in Istanbul, and perhaps as 
a result the restrictions of the 1770s may have been enforced only loosely.69 
Yet migration for Albanians remained difficult in the following decades, 
as the state tried ever harder to control the movements of poor, desperate 
people. 
Although the state might reasonably guess that its restrictions on mo- 
vement would simply increase the poverty and deprivation felt by so much 
of the Albanian population, it did have equally valid reasons for tightening 
them. The Albanians' bravery and skill with weapons created many job op- 
portunities for them as watchmen or guards, not only in derbends but in any 
valued place. The fact that Muslim Albanians long acted as guards and ca- 
retakers for important Orthodox sites in Kosovo excited curiosity amongst 
outside observers of the recent troubles there - but this kind of arrangement 
was replicated throughout the Balkans." The sites protected naturally were 
much more often secular than religious, and the owners also often wished 
to use Albanian guards to win immediate earthly rewards rather than to wait 
for the heavenly. The Khans of Crimea, for instance, gained a series of ~ i f t -  
liks near Burgos (Burgas, Bulgaria) in the early 1780s and set up shops in 
the newly-acquired villages, placing Albanians in the shops. One of the Al- 
banians' important duties apparently was to make sure that villagers did not 
go elsewhere to buy necessities to avoid the high prices in the shops. This 
was bad enough, but with the rise of banditry in the region, the Albanians 
also seemed to be too ready to shelter brigands in the giftliks. Istanbul orde- 
red the shops closed to resolve the issue.71 A problem on a much larger scale 
was that, given Albanians' reputation as superb warriors, they could always 
find employment in the army or, following the conclusion of peace in 1792, 
in the private retinues of the rich and powerful throughout the empire. De- 
mand for them among ayan remained strong for fifteen years after the end 
of the war, as these notables fought each other over territory and revenues.72 
Being little more than mercenaries in these struggles, many Albanians swit- 
ched sides when offered better or prompter pay, or, as has been noted, joined 
the ranks of the Mountain Bandits.I3 
The government of the Ottoman empire thus found itself confronting 
a multifaceted problem which proved to be remarkably stubborn. In order 
to resolve the Mountain Bandit crisis and restore peace in the Balkans, the 
movement of Albanian mercenaries had to be controlled. This required not 
only effective control over land and sea routes, but also stabilization and im- 
provement of conditions in the Albanian districts. This, in turn, depended on 
the state's assertion of effective authority in the teeth of resistance from such 
increasingly wealthy and powerful notables as Tepedelenli Ali Pasha and 
Bugatli Kara Mahmud Pasha. Could the Ottoman government accomplish 
any of these formidable tasks during the reign of Selim III? Its performance 
certainly suggests that it could not, in spite of prolonged efforts. 
The State's Methods of Restoring Peace and Justice 
Selim III's government did not have the strength or resiliency needed to 
rescue the Balkan provinces from the tremendous disorders of the 1790s 
and 1800s. In the wake of the war lost to Russia, Istanbul lacked the money 
necessary to raise, equip, and maintain a force large enough to crush the 
brigands; as one contemporary analyst pointed out, it would take twenty 
thousand men to hunt down four thousand bandits, given the rough and wild 
terrain in which they hid.74 Even with enough men, the state lacked capable 
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military commanders. As a result, the efforts to control the brigands depen- 
ded upon cooperation from all of the ayan, which some gave, while others 
did not. This is hardly surprising, given the strength of rivalries among 
provincial notables. These problems should not suggest that progress was 
never made: forces led by various ayan clashed with lawless gangs regular- 
ly, and a steady stream of messengers brought heads of bandits to Istanbul 
to prove that vigorous action was being taken. Yet as long as some brigand 
bands survived, and as long as the government outfitted forces to chase 
them, Albanians would be drawn to the arena of action. Unable to control 
the bandits effectively, Istanbul never managed to address adequately the 
issue of Albanian migration, let alone those even tougher tasks involved in 
bringing more order and prosperity to the western Balkans. 
The most constant measures applied, as suggested above, involved the 
setting up of a system to police transportation routes across the Balkans. 
A regime under which Albanians were allowed through passes and along 
roads only with written permission from district governors was well estab- 
lished by the second half of the 1790s, if not earlier.75 Istanbul also applied a 
measure commonly essayed in order to check the wilder impulses of possib- 
le troublemakers, including sekbans: the requirement of naming guarantors 
(kejl), or indeed the taking of hostages. Sometimes these methods worked, 
but none offered a perfect solution. One energetic vezir who campaigned 
against the Mountain Bandits, Haklu Pasha, wanted Tepedelenli Ali Pasha 
to seize as hostages relatives of leading southern Albanian bandits operating 
in present-day Bulgaria. Ali replied that he was willing to do so but pointed 
out, quite reasonably, that the measure would be unlikely to accomplish 
anything, since the brigands would know nothing of their far-off relatives' 
new plight.76 When Ali himself was later given the responsibility of quelling 
the Mountain Bandits, however, he did take hostages, apparently with some 
effect.77 Yet guarantors and hostages could not halt the flow of so many dis- 
parate groups and individuals from the region. 
The system of restrictions thus was intensified after the turn of the cen- 
tury, as part of a general tightening of restraints on movements by all and 
sundry in Ottoman Europe.78 By mid- 1803 no Albanians -even the soldiers 
so needed by those fighting the brigands-were to be allowed out of their 
homelands, even with the permission papers.79 Any responsible official who 
allowed such men to pass was threatened with dire consequences. Not all 
listened to orders, however. Tepedelenli Ali was often singled out by other 
frustrated officers of the state as bearing great responsibility for the conti- 
nuation of the Mountain Bandit problem because of his reluctance to close 
the mountain passes under his control.80 One of the offices which he held 
was derbendler ba$bugu, or supervisor of the system of guards watching the 
highland passes throughout much of the Balkans. His unwillingness to app- 
ly the rules restricting the movement of Albanians thus was particularly da- 
maging to their effectiveness, which makes the frustration of other officers 
quite understandable. Given that Ali himself was in charge of the operations 
against the Mountain Bandits in 1802 and did well in persuading many to 
settle down, why did he not cooperate in closing the passes? 
Ali had more to fear from closing the passes than from supervising them 
laxly and risking Istanbul's displeasure. Although his own status and autho- 
rity amongst the Tosks of the south was great, it was by no means unchallen- 
ged. He always had to struggle to control banditry even in the districts most 
under his control, let alone those still being absorbed after violent campa- 
igns against other notables. Ali would much rather see the kinsmen and fol- 
lowers of defeated rivals, as well as those who lost giftliks or other property 
to him, go elsewhere to try to mend their fortunes, rather than stay bottled 
up in or near his territory. The degree of his mastery over the passes is also 
debatable. The derbend system did not cover all of the Balkans (which in 
itself suggests that he did not bear sole responsibility for allowing disrepu- 
table bands to slip through) but did extend over a very large area. While he 
exercised greater mastery over the system than did his several predecessors, 
it seems likely that his ability to ensure complete closure of distant passes 
was less than absolute, even had he wished to. Ali was rarely, if ever, accu- 
sed of sending bands of brigands far from Albania, since his interests were 
focused on neighboring lands, but it does seem all too understandable that 
he did not spend much of his influence and resources on keeping those who 
wished to migrate from doing so. 
In light of Istanbul's demonstrated inability to bend Ali and other Balkan 
notables to its will and of the limited efficacy of its road-policing system, 
it is difficult to explain conclusively the ending of the Mountain Bandit era 
after Selim III's overthrow in 1807, and especially the dwindling of the Al- 
banian threat to public order. The deaths of several of the most powerful and 
willful ayan, including most notably Osman Pasvanoglu, certainly helped? 
No one of equal stature could rise to such levels of influence in lands which 
were exhausted by 1807. In some senses the Albanian provinces perhaps ga- 
ined some stability, as trade boomed during the Napoleonic period and the 
successors to Kara Mahmud in iSkodra showed themselves to be less troub- 
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lesome to their neighbors and the state." Plague also subsided for a num- 
ber of years after 1804. Another probable factor, however, was the renewed 
outbreak of war with Russia in 1806, which offered to many Albanians once 
again the opportunity to find employment in the Ottoman army. It is ironic 
that renewed warfare might have helped to reduce the problem of banditry, 
after having been so important in promoting it in the previous century. 
Conclusion 
Ottoman Europe suffered turmoil in the late eighteenth century that shook 
to its foundations Istanbul's structure of provincial authority. Violence and 
lawlessness are symptoms of frictions or tensions within a society, and no 
state has ever been entirely free of them. In this case, the veritable epidemic 
of brigandage points to the existence of widespread, fundamental problems. 
For the Albanian provinces of the western Balkans, the 1780s, 1790s, and 
1800s brought the most intense stretch of an extended period of turbulence, 
as rival notables became ever more aggressive in their attempts to secure 
for themselves wealth and power. Their actions caused rising impoverish- 
ment and misery in both town and country, both by outright destruction re- 
sulting from raid and counter-raid, and by promoting significant changes in 
the urban and rural economy. Notables gained control over ever more land 
through threats and force, imposing thereafter heavy revenue burdens upon 
the remaining peasants. Commerce, in turn, suffered from the insecurity 
promoted by the conflicts, and by the de facto creation of internal borders 
defended by rival ayan. The local notables were taking advantage of the 
imperial government's preoccupation with immediate threats to its own 
existence, and many Albanians who had no secure place in this environ- 
ment chose to emigrate. Given both the lack of viable peaceful opportuniti- 
es and the plunder to be taken in other chaotic, ill-defended provinces, it is 
no surprise that so many chose the option of banditry. For the state, pressed 
by severe external threats, mounting internal challenges, and suffering a 
visible loss of domestic authority and power, little could be done quickly to 
repair the damage suffered by the Albanian provinces. Many years would 
pass before Istanbul could muster the resources needed to crush the last 
of the powerful ayan of the Balkans, Tepedelenli Ali Pasha.83 The move 
came too late to repair the old system, as the various layers of lawlessness 
eventually provoked successful revolts against Ottoman rule amongst first 
Serbs and then Greeks. These revolts, of course, were to push the Ottoman 
state toward the full-scale reform or modernization projects of the ninete- 
enth century. 
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